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Akron Law Review
NEW PATTERNS IN JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
THE PRESIDENCY: 1950's to 1970's
P. ALLAN DIoNIsoPOULOS*
INTRODUCTION
N EW PATTERNS IN JUDICIAL CONTROL of the presidency have emerged
since the early 1950's, permitting us to question the validity of the
usual commentaries of constitutional scholars.' For the most part, these com-
mentaries have focused upon the infrequency and inefficacy of judicial checks
upon presidential powers, claiming that they operate only upon minor issues
or in cases arising under unique circumstances. For example, Professor Schu-
bert has stated that Americans expect the Supreme Court to "uphold the
majesty of the law against the pretensions of a usurper." However, he adds
that such an expectation is not supported by history, since "in every major
constitutional crisis ... the President has emerged the victor."' Other schol-
ars, such as Professor Rossiter, have found little in American constitutional
history resembling a major victory for the Court, with the possible exceptions
of Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States,' and Youngstown Sheet and Tube
Co. v. Sawyer.'
Distinguished from these negative commentaries is the claim offered
herein that important changes in the pattern of executive-judicial encounters
began to take place in the 1950's. However, American constitutional scholars
have not perceived this development, apparently because of a tendency to
view the judiciary's control of the presidency in terms of its own limitations
rather than the restraints imposed by it on a co-equal branch. For example,
the Youngstown decision of 19521 was seen as a major but aberrant victory.
However, hindsight permits us to herald this decision as having initiated a
*Professor of Political Science, Northern Illinois University; B.A., B.S., M.A., University
of Minnesota; Ph.D., U.C.L.A.
I See, e.g., J. GROSSMAN & R. WELLS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND JUDICIAL POLICY
MAKING 555 (1972); C. PRITCHETr, THE AMERICAN CONSTrrUTION 380 (2d ed. 1968);
C. ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 56 (2d ed. 1960), and C. ROSSITER, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 112 (1951); G. SCHUBERT, CONSTrru-
TIONAL POLITICS 360 (1960), and G. ScHUmBRT, THE PRESIDENCY IN THE COURTS 4
(1957).
2 G. ScmmERT, THE PRESIDENCY IN THE CoURTS 4 (1957).
3 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
'343 U.S. 579 (1952).
5Id.
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major break with the past. In fact, we may now characterize it in the terms
used by Professor Westin6 in describing the most recent executive-judicial
encounter, United States v. Nixon.7 That decision, Westin stated, was both
predictable and atypical. Possibly, Nixon, may be characterized as typical of
what has been occurring within the past quarter of a century.
I. United States v. Nixon: TYPICAL OR ATYPICAL?
The predictability of Nixon, Westin reports, derives from the fact that
since Marbury v. Madison8 the Court has followed "a set of basic, un-
written rules" in deciding whether it will accept jurisdiction over a case
that questions the legitimacy of presidential action. If there is the likelihood
of presidential defiance of a ruling or of reprisals against the prestige and
powers of the judiciary, the Court will avoid involvement, leaving the reso-
lution of the issue to the political process.9 On the other hand, if the Court
anticipates popular and congressional approval of its ruling, it will accept
jurisdiction in the belief that the President will not act in disobedience to its
decision."0
While the decision's predictability is in accord with other commentaries
on judicial control of the presidency," its atypicality is in accord with the
argument that the courts' power to check presidential actions may no longer
be described by such narrow terms. Recent developments indicate that the
situation is no longer the same as it had been prior to the 1950's, for, as
Westin points out, Nixon "does not fit at all the general character of major
executive-judicial encounters in our history.' However, this decision does
fit into the most recent history of such confrontations in that, since 1957,
"and especially during the last two years of the Nixon Presidency, the federal
courts did decide some important cases that curtailed presidential claims
of authority."' 8
For purposes of this study, that which is characterized as atypical is
more important than that described as predictable. In fact, given the more
recent history to which Westin refers, it is likely that Nixon is typical,
not atypical, just as we may now say that the Youngstown decision of 1952"
6A. WESTIN, THE CASE FOR AMERICA, United States v. Nixon: THE PRESIDENT BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT xi (1974) [hereinafter cited as A. WESTIN].
T418 U.S. 683 (1974).
8 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9 See A. WESTIN, supra note 6, at xii-xiii.
10 Id. at xiii.
II See commentaries cited note 1 supra.
12 See A. WESTN, supra note 6, at xvii-xix.
Is Id. at xix.
4 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See text accompanying notes 4 and 5, supra.
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was not aberrant but a forerunner in a new era in which federal courts
acted boldly in challenging presidential powers. The Youngstown decision
was unique in that it deviated from other wartime cases in which the Supreme
Court refused to question the President's role as Commander in Chief and
to challenge his responsibility to fulfill America's military mission." At
best, the Court acted to curb presidential powers only after the war had
ended,"6 or after the government had announced its intention to implement
the very policy the Court now ordered."
The aberrant Youngstown and the atypical Nixon may yet prove to
be no more than identifiable points on a time line, marking the beginning
and the end of one era in which federal courts willingly questioned the
legitimacy of presidential actions. On the other hand, there is also the
possibility that these decisions will emerge as landmarks of a quite different
kind, distinguishing the most recent historical record from that compiled
earlier, and indicating that a change in the pattern of executive-judicial
encounters is presently occurring. There are indications that federal courts
are carving out areas wherein their involvement can be expected, while
reserving to the executive branch other provinces into which the judiciary
will not intrude, such as international politics and questions of war and
peace.'"
A change in the pattern has occurred, even though the courts continue
to hold that some questions are not amenable to the judicial process. 9 Its
visibility is marked by the fact that the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts have entertained a variety of questions about the legitimacy of claimed
presidential prerogatives and powers regarding: (1) the scope of executive
privilege;" (2) the authority to order warrantless, electronic surveillance
of domestic security risks, a practice which dates back to May, 1940;" (3)
15See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
16 See, e.g., Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
17 See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
18 See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304 (1973), treating the presidentially
ordered bombing of Cambodia (motion to vacate judgment of lower court denied);
Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970), regarding the legitimacy of presidential wars,
(motion to file bill of complaint denied).
19 Certiorari was denied in the following cases: Sarnoff v. Schultz, 409 U.S. 929 (1972);
Da Costa v. Laird, 405 U.S. 979 (1972); Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967);
Mitchell v. United States, 386 U.S. 972 (1967).
20 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Environmental Protection Agency
v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
21 See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
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the power to cope with subversives;"2 (4) the extent to which the executive
branch may impose prior restraints upon publications in the name of
national security;" (5) the power to impound funds appropriated by Con-
gress;21 (6) the exercise of the removal power over members of independent
regulatory agencies; " and (7) the boundaries within which the executive
branch must conduct criminal prosecutions." The cases which raised these
questions are significant in themselves for they appeared with some fre-
quency and revealed a willingness by federal judges to curtail presidential
powers in particular areas. They are also meaningful because many of the
issues raised were ones of first impression", thereby permitting the courts
to render landmark decisions and to set forth judicial guidelines to govern the
policy makers. For example, in unanimously declaring that a president is
without authority to order warrantless, electronic surveillance of domestic
security risks,28 the Supreme Court voided a practice exercised by the execu-
tive branch for more than thirty years. At the same time, it cautioned
members of Congress against violating the Fourth Amendment, should they
decide to confer surveillance power on the presidency." The federal courts
by entering into alliances with Congress, state and local authorities, and
segments of the private sector, as in the impoundment"' and environmental 2
cases, were able to provide judicial answers where none previously existed
and made it possible for Congress to seize the initiative, as it did by limiting
the President's power to impound appropriated funds.8 Also noteworthy
22 Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Cole
v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
23 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). Generally referred to by
its popular name The Pentagon Papers Case.
24 See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir.
1974); State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973); National Council
of Community Mental Health Centers, Inc. v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C.
1973); Oklahoma v. Weinberger, 360 F. Supp. 724 (W.D. Okla. 1973); New York v.
Ruckelshaus, 358 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973).
25 Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
26 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
27 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700
(1973), regarding the scope of executive privilege with respect to material relevant to a
criminal proceeding.
28 See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
2Old. at 310-11, where it is reported that since May, 1940, Presidents had been authoriz-
ing warrantless wiretapping and surveillance "in matters involving the defense of the
nation." See also V. NAVAKSY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 135-155 (1971).
30 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 323 (1972).
31 See State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973).
32 See Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). Mrs. Mink is a
United States Representative from Hawaii.
33The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 31 U.S.C. § 1301
(Supp. IV 1974).
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is the fact that in a number of recent cases the President was named the
defendant." This practice was unknown since Mississippi v. Johnson,"5 and
is contrary to an interpretation, reported less than a decade ago, regarding
the stance adopted by the Supreme Court that, "while the President himself
cannot be held liable to judicial process, the subordinates who carry out
his orders can." 8 Apparently federal courts are no longer reluctant to hold
the President liable to judicial process."'
I. PARALLELS IN RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Are recent circumstances responsible for whatever victories the courts
have known in more recent years? This question should be answered, since
scholars usually attribute any judicial victory over the presidency to the
situation in which the case arose.3" For example, they state that the Supreme
Court will act boldly after the emergency has passed, 9 and after a policy
change has been signaled by the government.4" The Supreme Court will
also act when the judges can rely on popular and congressional approval of
their ruling. 1 Circumstances have been important in these more recent
instances of federal courts' checking presidential power. However, they are
not the usually identified ones. What should be noted is the parallel de-
velopments which have occurred on two fronts, since the courts have acted
vigorously to curb congressional powers no less than the executive's. The
incidents of congressional-judicial encounters have occurred within a larger
time frame, dating back to 1943, in which federal courts have voided
national laws at a rate and for purposes never before known in American
constitutional history."3 For instance, between 1791 and 1965, not a single
national law was voided on First Amendment grounds. 3 Since 1965, twelve
34 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Murphy v. Ford, 390 F. Supp. 372
(W.D. Mich. 1975); Senate Select Comm. v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51 (D.D.C. 1973);
In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Myers v. Nixon, 339 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D. N.Y. 1972); Atlee v. Nixon, 336
F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
35 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1811).
36 W. WILLOUGHBY, CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 92 (3d ed. 1968).
37 One exception is Atlee v. Nixon, 336 F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Atlee
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973).
38 See C. PRITCHETr, supra note 1, at 381.
3 See, e.g., Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
40 See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
41 See A. WESTIN, supra note 6.
42 See Dionisopoulos, The Uniqueness of the Warren and Burger Courts in American Constitu-
tional History, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 737 (1973).
43 See Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National Policy
Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 292 (1957).
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statutes have been nullified for abridging First Amendment freedoms.4 4
Another fundamental freedom - the right to travel - was accorded the
protection of the Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment;" and the
Supreme Court indirectly nullified the anti-abortion statute for the District
of Columbia, which violated a woman's right to privacy under several amend-
ments.
Since World War II, other national statutes had been voided either
because they abridged constitutional rights or because they denied equal
protection to certain classes of Americans. The Supreme Court nullified ten
laws on due process grounds 6 between 1943 and 1974, and it voided others
by making them virtually unenforceable" or enforceable only in specified
situations. 8 The Court also voided five statutory provisions which forcibly
deprived Americans of citizenship. 9 It also declared that Congress has
no authority to place civilians under the jurisdiction of military tribunals,
whether they are former servicemen,50 dependents residing with service per-
sonnel overseas,5 or civil service employees at American military installa-
tions outside the United States.5"
44See Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976); Chief of Capitol Police v. Jeannette Rankin
Brigade, 409 U.S. 972 (1972); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Blount v.
Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971), in which two statutory provisions were nullified; Schacht v.
United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970); United States v. Rebel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Lamont
v. Day, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Boorda v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 421 F.2d 1142
(D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1042 (1970); Reed v. Gardner, 261 F. Supp.
87 (C.D. Cal. 1966). Two statutes were nullified by a district court panel in Stewart v.
Washington, 301 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1969).
45 Aptheker v. Rusk, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
46 Two statutes were voided in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). Others were
invalidated in Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968); United States v. Jackson,
390 U.S. 570 (1968); United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965); Albertson v.
Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70 (1965); United States v. Brown, 381
U.S. 437 (1965); United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952); United States v. Lovett,
328 U.S. 303 (1946); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
4 Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S.
39 (1968); United States v. Communist Party of the United States, 377 U.S. 968 (1964).
48 Three sections of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 930 and
934) were in issue in O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). In holding that a soldier
could not be tried by court martial for offenses committed away from military installa-
tion, the Court declined to nullify the laws themselves, and thereby impliedly affirmed the
tradition that military personnel be tried by a military tribunal irrespective of the jurisdic-
tion in which the offense was committed. This was underscored by Justices Harlan,
Stewart and White in their dissenting opinion founded at 281-82.
4 9 See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964);
Rusk v. Cort, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963);
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
50 See Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
51 See Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
52 See Wilson v. Bohlender, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960);
Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960).
[Vol. 10:1
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Between 1954 and 1975, the Supreme Court voided eight laws on equal
protection grounds, 3 and a ninth was declared unconstitutional by a district
court panel for the same reason.54 Within the past few years, the Court also
voided provisions in national laws in Oregon v. Mitchell
5 and Department
of Agriculture v. Murray.5" Finally, because of a spillover effect from state
cases, 7 the Court nullified all national laws that permitted the unequal im-
position of the death penalty which had been possible under state laws."
8
This record since World War II exhibits a willingness of federal courts
to protect civil liberties to a degree never before known in our history.
5
More important, however, it sets a pattern within which the recent instances
of judicial control over the presidency can be inserted. The assumption is
offered that a more vigorous judicial response to questions concerning the
legitimacy of presidential actions bears a direct relationship to these other
recent developments in constitutional law. This response is not the result
of the long, divisive, "presidential" war in Vietnam. In the search for cir-
cumstances to explain recent executive-judicial encounters, this larger judicial
record will be seen to parallel the latest developments in American con-
stitutional law.
1m. QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO THE COURTS
To substantiate the claim that a new pattern in executive-judicial con-
frontations has been emerging, an examination and evaluation of decisions
since the 1950's must be made.6" Before proceeding to that task, an even
larger frame of reference must be established, one that both accepts Westin's
idea of "a set of basic, unwritten rules," and rejects the narrow definition
he provides. Westin contends that this set provides answers only for the
jurisdictional question and is comprised of but two options. First, the Court
will avoid acquiring jurisdiction if it is probable that the President will
defy a ruling or that the prestige of the judicial branch will suffer. Second,
53 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 508 (1973); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), in which two
statutes were nullified; Richardson v. Davis, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Washington v.
Legrant, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
54 Diaz v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
55 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
58 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
57 E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
5s This situation is evidenced by President Nixon's proposal to Congress that death penalty
provisions in national laws be amended to conform to the Court's ruling. A WEEKLY
COMPLIATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 246 (1973).
59 Dionisopoulos, supra note 42, at 741.
60 This may well be considered an extension of another study analyzing cases through
1956. G. SHUBERT, supra note 2.
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it will accept jurisdiction if it can rely upon popular and congressional
support."'
This "set of basic, unwritten rules" is deficient in significant respects.
First, the judiciary is by no means limited to two alternatives in deciding
jurisdictional issues. Second, as demonstrated in the cases challenging Amer-
ica's involvement in Vietnam, 2 the fact that the Court may rely upon
popular and congressional support is no guarantee that jurisdiction will
be assumed. Moreover, what is necessary is an understanding of the relation-
ship between the courts and the presidency, something that requires analysis
beyond the question of when will the Court acquire jurisdiction. These
points may be briefly elaborated before a different set of standards for
understanding executive-judicial encounters is offered.
Federal courts may avoid confrontation with the executive branch for
reasons other than that their prestige is at stake or that their rulings may
be defied. For example, the judges may sincerely believe that the resolution
of an issue should be properly left to the political process. With respect
to this point, Judge Learned Hand once commented: "For myself, it would
be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I
knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not." 3 Also appropriate
on this point is a statement by Justices Powell, Burger and Blackmun con-
curring in Frontiero v. Richardson."
But democratic institutions are weakened, and confidence in the restraint
of the Court is impaired, where we appear unnecessarily to decide
sensitive issues of broad social and political importance at the very
time they are under consideration within the prescribed constitutional
processes. 5
Judicial self-restraint may thus come from a sincere commitment to making
democratic institutions function responsibly. In that case, the likely response
of the President and the possibility of approval from the general public and
Congress have no relevancy as to whether the Court will involve itself.
On a number of occasions, beginning with Mitchell v. United States"6
61 A. WESTIN, supra note 6, at xiii.
62 See, e.g., cases cited notes 18 and 19 supra; Atlee v. Nixon, 411 U.S. 911 (1973);
Hart v. United States, 391 U.S. 956 (1968); Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S. 936(1968); Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971); Myers v. Nixon, 339
F. Supp. 1388 (S.D. N.Y. 1972).
63 L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (Atheneum ed. 1972).
64411 U.S. 677 (1973).
65 Id. at 692. See also Holtz man v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S, 1304, 1314 (1973).
6 386 U.S, 972 (1967),
AzRON LAW l~vr~w [VCol. I0:1
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and Mora v. McNamara" and continuing through Holtzman v. Schlesinger,
68
the constitutionality of America's military presence in Vietnam was ques-
tioned. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, our involvement in Vietnam and
Cambodia was increasingly questioned by Americans for a number of
reasons. The toll that the war took of men and material, the fact that
neither a military nor political solution appeared possible, the unfavorable
attitude that Americans expressed against continued involvement in South-
east Asia, and the increasing Congressional opposition to our military pres-
ence in Vietnam"9 created precisely the climate in which the Court could
have expected popular and congressional support for a judicial ruling on
the constitutional issues raised. Nevertheless, with the exception of Justice
Douglas 0 and sporadic dissent from others,"' the Court steadfastly refused
to review such cases." Popular and congressional support was foreseeable
but irrelevant to the Court's decision against granting jurisdiction.
It is also possible for the judiciary to foresee victory for reasons other
than the anticipation of popular and congressional approval of the ruling.
In fact, there exists a class of issues over which the judiciary need not hesitate
at all to determine issues of a peculiarly legal character arising in criminal
cases. For example, the courts may dismiss indictments, as when Marshall
found the charge of treason against Aaron Burr to be constitutionally defec-
tive."3 The courts may declare that the executive branch has no authority to
obtain the evidence in the manner acquired."' A federal judge may rule that
continued prosecution is impermissible because of corruption of the case by
the executive branch's tactics. 5 The courts may dismiss cases because of the
government's refusal to make portions of the evidence available to the
67 389 U.S. 934 (1973).
68414 U.S. 1304 (1973).
69 For an examination of the changing attitudes among various segments of American
society, see C. KAnusHIN, THE AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL ELITE 154-219 (1974). Congres-
sional opposition was reflected in the Fullbright Proviso, first enacted in 1970, 84 Stat.
910 (1970), and "attached to every subsequent military appropriations act." See Justice
Marshall's Opinion in Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1306 (1973).
70 See, e.g., his discussions in Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1315 (1973);
Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 895 (1970); Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934
(1967); Mitchell v. United States, 386 U.S. 972 (1967).
71 Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 900 (1970) (Harlan & Stewart, JJ.); Mora v.
McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967) (Stewart, J.).
72 See, e.g., cases cited notes 18, 19, and 62 supra.
73 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 469 (1807).
7 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 303 (1972).
75 See text of Judge Byrne's statement dismissing thC ,llsberg case, N.Y. TuIES, May 12, 1973,
at 14, col 4.
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defense."6 On such issues, the judiciary may act with impunity, knowing that
there remains nothing that the President can do to defy its rulings. The
President may be able to use some other agency for bringing the accused
to justice. Such was the case when Jefferson succeeded in having a co-
conspirator of Burr, John Smith of Ohio, removed from the Senate, after
prosecution of the Senator was dropped due to the dismissal of Burr's in-
dictment. 7 However, the options for circumventing the courts in such cases
are extremely limited.
There are also matters of importance other than the judiciary's accep-
tance of jurisdiction. An understanding of judicial control of the presidency
requires knowledge of the consequences of the courts' involvment. For
example, it may be that the presidential action has been legitimized by the
Supreme Court and henceforth serves as a precedent,"8 albeit one that is
later challenged in various forums."9 It may be that the decision comes too
late to be of any benefit, other than compensatory, to the plaintiff, as in
Humphrey's Executor v. United States0 and Wiener v. United States;8 1 but
it may be that it serves as a deterrent to future Presidential actions.8" Judicial
involvement and a subsequent decision rendered may also have a deterrent
effect, even though the President responsible for the action or policy no
longer occupies the office.8" These last examples point to the need to com-
76 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). See also United States v. United States District
Court, 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1971).
7 7 See P. DIONIsOPOULos, REBELLION, RACISM AND REPRESENTATION: THE ADAM CLAY-
TON POWELL CASE AND ITS ANTECEDENTS 53 (1970).
78 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863) sanctioned the President's committing
the United States to hostilities, without a declaration of war, and of otherwise putting into
effect policies considered necessary in achieving military goals. Undoubtedly, this became
a precedent for other Presidents. That it may nonetheless be critized is evident in the vol-
uminous literature of recent years, questioning the validity of presidential wars. See especially
Legality of United States Participation in the Viet Nam Conflict: A Symposium, 75
YALE L.J. 1084 (1966). Another example is Korematsu v. United States. 323 U.S. 214(1944). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Jackson warned his colleagues against sanction-
ing "a military expedient that has no place under the Constitution." Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944). See also V. ROSENBLUM & A. CASTBERG, JUDGES AS
VALIDATORS OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS, CASES ON CONSTTrUTIONAL LAW: PoLmcAL
ROLES OF THE SUPREME COURT 144 (1973).
79 See, e.g., Haak, Co-opting the Oppressors: The Case of the Japanese-Americans, 7 SOCIETY
23 (1970). See generally A. BOSWORTH, AMERICA'S CONCENTRATION CAMPS (1967).
80 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
81 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
82 The deterrent effect may be questionable in view of Wiener which presumably should
never have happened, given Humphrey's Executor. However, how many unauthorized
removals might have occurred had these cases not been decided?
83 Lincoln's proclamation that civilians charged with aiding the Confederacy would be
tried by military commissions was not voided until after the end of the Civil War and
the assassination of President Lincoln. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
Similarly, an order issued by President Truman to prevent subversive from acquiring employ-
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prehend not only when or whether the courts will become involved, but also
the efficacy of their check upon the presidency. There are, then, "basic,
unwritten rules" that encompass more than the two alternatives described
by Westin.
IV. MEANS FOR UNDERSTANDING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE PRESIDENCY
A set of guidelines, similar to Brandeis' criteria which explains why
the Court exercises the power of judicial review,8" can be drawn from
American constitutional history. It can provide answers to a variety of
questions with respect to confrontations between the executive and judicial
branches. Some guidelines will help clarify those issues over which either
the President or the judiciary may claim an exclusive power to make a final
disposition. They will also direct our attention to the consequences, both
immediate and long-term, of the courts' involvement. Still other guidelines
will aid in determining the efficacy of judicial control of the presidency.
Is judicial control operative only when minor issues are involved or because
of peculiar circumstances? Or may we say that this judicial check is more
efficacious than the literature would lead us to believe? The following are
offered as more capable means for judging executive-judicial encounters
than Westin's "set of basic, unwritten rules."
The judiciary can act boldly to curb presidential powers, however, the
President can defy the ruling by maintaining the invalidated policy. The
courts are powerless to provide a meaningful response. Ex parte Merryman
5
is the sole example of this situation. It was one in which Chief Justice Roger
Taney, while serving in his concurrent capacity as a circuit court judge,
issued a writ of habeas corpus. The writ was defied by military authorities
acting under presidential direction. Taney then declared this presidential
order unconstitutional. Abraham Lincoln neither acknowledged receipt of
Taney's opinion nor acted in a manner indicative of presidential compliance."
Secondly, there is also a strong likelihood that the Court will decline
jurisdiction when it is apparent that the President would not abide by a
judicial ruling. The reasons given, if an opinion is written, may entail such
legal grounds as the doctrine of political questions, nonjusticiability, or the
ment in the merchant marine was held to exceed statutory authority, a decision that
came fifteen years after he left office. Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968).
84Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 342 (1936) (concurring
opinion).
85 17 F. Cas. 144 (No. 9487) (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
.
8 See C. PRITCHETT, supra note 1; C. ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COM-
MANDER IN CQEF 25 (1951).
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party's lack of standing to sue. Ex parte Vallandigham"7 stands as a prime
example of judicial avoidance, and probably occurred because President
Lincoln would likely have reacted in the manner that he did following
Taney's decision in Ex parte Merryman."
On other occasions, the Court may refuse to involve itself at all by
its denial of certiorari without comment. This occurred in the cases which
questioned the constitutionality of military involvment in Vietnam89 and
the authority of former President Nixon to continue bombing of Khmer
Rouge camps in Cambodia.9 ° The implications are that the Court will re-
fuse to exercise jurisdiction and to adjudicate the issue by relying upon
the political question doctrine or other "passive virtues."'" However,
avoidance is actually prompted by fear of Presidential recalcitrance with the
possibility of resulting dimunition to judicial prestige. The true motivational
reasons become evident when the underlying circumstances are evaluated or
when dissenting statements of justices favoring the grant of jurisdiction are
scrutinized."2
There are instances that have the appearance of the foregoing cases.
However, refusal to grant jurisdiction arises not from fear for its prestige, but
from its sincere belief that the issue will be more properly resolved by
political institutions. Although the issue may be constitutional in nature,
such as what constitutes a republican form of government within the meaning
of the Constitution,93 the Court declares that the question does not lend
itself to a judicial response. 4
The judiciary involves itself in cases questioning the legitimacy of a
presidential action. The Court renders a decision, declaring that the executive
branch acted in an improper or illegal manner. The Court then avoids a
decisive confrontation by declining to issue an order providing the plaintiff's
87 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 243 (1864). See C. PRITCHETr, supra note 1, at 380-81.
88 17 F. Cas. 144 (No. 9487) (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
9 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970); Holmes v. United States, 391U.S. 936 (1968); Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967); Massachusetts v. Laird,
451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971).
90 See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304 (1973).
91 See Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 Y.EL.J. 517 (1966). See also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 69 (1972).
92 See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1316 and 1322 (1973) (Douglas, J. dissent-
ing); Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 895 (1970); Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S.
936 (1968).
93 Luther v. Borden, 43 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
94 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962) (Frankfurter & Harlan, JJ., dissenting);
South v. Peters, 338 U.S. 276 (1950); MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948); Colegrove
v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
[Vol  10:1
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 10 [1977], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol10/iss1/8
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE PRESIDENCY
requested remedy. 5 The President is thereby assured victory although one
that may be modified by the Court's simultaneous assertion of its power of
judicial review."6 This will create a precedent upon which the judiciary may
subsequently rely.
The courts may assume jurisdiction in cases challenging the legitimacy
of an exercised presidential power, and ultimately decide the case in such
manner as to legitimize the presidential action.97 Although the decision may
later be questioned as to its constitutional validity, s it nevertheless serves
as a precedent for similar actions by subsequent Presidents."9
The judiciary may also acquire jurisdiction, and then transcend the
scope of the issues presented and actually enhance presidential power.'
0
On the other hand, it may declare that the President has neither constitutional
nor statutory authority for the action exercised, thereby voiding the power.
However, the decision may be weakened by the fact that divergence of
opinions among the Justices exists. A majority of justices declare that the
President does have the power claimed, while others limit the power to certain
circumstances.' 01 Hence the determination of the invalidity of the power may
vary according to the factual setting.
95 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173 (1803).
96 Id. at 176. Ordinarily this decision is credited with establishing the power of judicial
review as inherent in the judicial power. However, the power to nullify laws was previous-
ly known and exercised in United States v. Yale Todd, a 1794 decision that was not
reported until it appeared as a footnote to United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.)
42, 52 (1854), and in Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). In Hylton v.
United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796), it was proposed that the Court void a
carriage tax on constitutional grounds. By taking jurisdiction and validating the law, the
Court implied that it had the power to declare legislative acts null and void.
97See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Jackson cautioned against the Court's sanctioning "a military expedient that has
no place under the Constitution." See also The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635
(1863), which sanctioned presidential war powers exercised in the absence of a declara-
tion of war by Congress.
98 See, e.g., textual materials cited note 79 supra. In recent years considerable literature
has been published questioning the validity of "presidential wars." E.g., Legality of United
States Participation in the Viet Nam Conflict: A Symposium, 75 YALE L.J. 1084 (1966).
99 See Department of State, Office of Legal Adviser, Legality of United States Participation
in the Defense of Viet Nam, 75 YALE L.J. 1085 (1966).
100 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
101 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Even
though the Court, by a 6 to 3 decision, declared that President Truman had neither
constitutional nor statutory authority to order the seizure and operation of the steel
mills, this may also be seen as a 5 to 4 vote for exactly this executive power under
certain circumstances. There were a total of seven opinions presented, including five
concurring opinions and one dissent by Justices Vinson, Reed and Minton. To the
dissenters' support of this particular presidential power may be added the votes of
Justices Clark and Burton, for they stated that under certain circumstances the President
may act as Truman had on this occasion. Id. at 659 and 662. In a similar manner, New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), represents less of an impact to
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The judiciary may grant jurisdiction. However, while it finds that a
corrective remedy is available with respect to the executive action in
question, it may then decide that the responsibility for curbing presidential
power lies elsewhere. 102
The Court may even act to curb presidential power. However, its
decision may become operative at a time when its impact is significantly
lessened for the President responsible for the questionable action or order,
since he may no longer reside in office and may even be deceased.108 Its
importance is then determined by its effect as a deterrent to other Presidents.
A decision curbing presidential power may also be rendered too late
to benefit the plaintiff, who dies while the case is making its way through
the courts, Humphrey's Executor v. United States,"" or whose office may
have terminated before the Court reviewed the issue, Wiener v. United
States.105 At best the plaintiff or his estate is compensated. But the President
was able to effectively remove a member of an independent regulatory
commission and to fill the vacancy with an appointee of his own choosing.
The presumed deterrent effect of the Humphrey decision in 1935 may
be of doubtful validity, as shown almost a quarter of a century later in
Wiener. The only effective check, should the President decide to act con-
trary to Humphrey and Wiener, would be the Senate's refusal to confirm
any presidential nominee. 06
The Court may accept jurisdiction and feel secure in declaring that
presidential power than may facially appear. The several concurring opinions by Brennan,White, Stewart and Marshall lend support to the argument that in some cases, as when
national security is threatened, prior restraint of publications may be ordered.
102See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972), wherein Chief Justice Burger re-
marked:
Carried to its logical end, this approach would have the federal courts as virtually
continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of executive action; such a
role is appropriate for the Congress acting through its committees and the
'power of the purse'; it is not the role of the judiciary, absent actual present orimmediately threatened injury resulting from unlawful governmental action.See also Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 400 U.S. 73 (1973).
103 See cases cited note 83 supra.
104 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
105 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
106 U.S. CONST. art. II, §2 provides:
... [Hie shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint . . . Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are notherein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law ....Of course, members of independent regulatory agencies are appointed in accordance withprocedures established by law, however, the power to nominate is vested in the President,
and the power to approve is in the Senate, as provided for in the Constitution.
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the President exceeded constitutional or statutory authority, simply because
he is "on the ropes," battered by his several constituences. 1°0
The judiciary can safely involve itself where questions are raised relative
to competing claims for power by the executive and legislative branches."'
The request for the resolution of these claims may arise from a third party,1'
or it may be that Congress had withdrawn its objection before a decision
had been reached." 0
Federal courts can curb presidential power by entering into alliances
with Congress, the states, or other entities. The broad-based character of these
alliances may persuade the President to refrain from acting contrary to
the ruling.11
Even though the situation may exist as just mentioned, since the
Supreme Court generally cannot be involved until the cases have come
through appellate channels," 2 the President may disregard the lower court
decisions rendered against him."' The implications are, as first suggested
in the Watergate tapes case,"' that the President will comply only when there
is a "definitive" ruling by the highest tribunal." 5
The Court may act to curb -presidential power and be reasonably
confident that the President will obey, providing it elicits the "definitive"
107 Principal examples include United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Youngstown
Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
108 See United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6 (1932).
109 See The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929).
110 See Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482 (1932).
-' The best examples are the several Watergate tapes and documents cases. See, e.g., United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
However, it should be noted that the alliances in the impoundment cases (note 24 supra)
did not force President Nixon to comply with the many decisions against him. Possibly the
situation would have been different had the Court agreed to exercise its original jurisdiction
in Georgia v. Nixon, 414 U.S. 810 (1973), and had it ruled as lower federal courts did. The
impoundment decisions were at least a contributing factor in Congress' passage of the Bud-
geting Act of 1973 and Nixon's signing the legislation into law. The purpose of the act was
to impose curbs on presidential impoundment practices of long standing. Note, Impoundment
of Funds, 86 Htv. L. REv. 1505 (1973).
112 See, e.g., Georgia v. Nixon, 414 U.S. 810 (1973).
11 3 See Glass, Presidential Impoundment of Congressionally Appropriated Funds: An Analy-
sis of Recent Court Decisions, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
(1974).
114 Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
115 After the Court of Appeals ruled 5 to 2 against President Nixon, he expressed confidence
"that the dissenting opinions, which are in accord with what until now has always been
regarded as the law would be sustained upon review by the Supreme Court." Text of the
President's statement was reported in the press on October 20, 1973. See also A. WESTTN,
supra note 6, at xx.
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ruling to which President Nixon spoke. Such a ruling is one in which there is
a single opinion which is unanimously supported by all participating
justices."'
Federal courts may also use legal devices such as a dismissal of an
indictment," ' or they may effectively block further prosecution through
other means."' As shown by United States v. Burr"9 and United States v.
Ellsberg,"0 prosecution may be the sine qua non for the administration
a goal for which there is no peer.
As demonstrated by the foregoing, federal courts wield the capability
to provide a variety of responses when the legitimacy of presidential actions
is scrutinized. They may confirm presidential powers by refusing to grant
certiorari.'' They may acquire jurisdiction and sanction presidential ac-
tions by their approval of executive prerogatives and powers. 2 ' They may
curb presidential powers, although the effects of their decisions must be
variously evaluated.' Finally, there are situations in which federal courts
may claim absolute supremacy, for no effective counterchecks exist among
presidential powers. "
While not all of the previously stated guidelines are applicable to cases
arising since 1957, those that are will enhance the understanding of when and
how the courts become involved in confrontations with the presidency.
For purposes of this study, the cases arising since 1957 may be
categorized as follows: 1) instances where the courts have strengthened
presidential powers, either by declining to become enmeshed in the issue,'2
116 Significantly, two of the most sensitive and far-reaching decisions of recent years are in
this category. In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), a single unanimous opinion was
delivered. While Justice Douglas offered a concurring opinion in United States v. United
States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 324 (1972), the unanimity of the Court was not dimin-
ished. Certainly his concurring opinion did not create the same doubt concerning the signifi-
cance of judiciary imposed restraints as in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co.
x1 See, e.g., United States v. Burr, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 684 (1807), wherein Chief Justice
Marshall addresses himself solely to the question of the indictment's validity.
118 See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
119 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 684 (1807).
120 See also United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812), wherein the Court
dismissed prosecution on the grounds that the offense charged was based upon common law
and neither proscribed nor otherwise defined as a crime by statute.
121 Especially relevant here are the many cases involving questions about America's military
presence in Southeast Asia. See cases cited notes 18 and 19 supra.
122 See cases cited note 15 supra.
123 See cases cited note 78 supra.
124 See cases cited notes 118-120 supra.
'25 See cases cited notes 18 and 19 supra.
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or by indicating that the presidency may exercise power under certain
circumstances, as in New York Times Co. v. United States;"8 2) cases in
which federal courts have specified the limits of executive privilege and pre-
rogatives; 2 " 3) the occasions in which the courts have prohibited, limited
or sanctioned presidential powers to deal with subversives;128 4) the in-
stances where the courts have denied any power to the President, constitutional
or statutory, to impound funds;1"9 and 5) the areas of judicial supremacy
- criminal prosecutions that may be brought to a halt by application of
a technical rule. 3'
V. JUDICIAL SANCTION OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS
Federal courts have neither felt qualified to answer more than peri-
pheral questions about international relations... nor disposed to regard
central issues on war and peace as properly arising within the framework
of the Constitution.' Their attitude is summarized in Justice Sutherland's
statement:
... the investment of the federal government with the powers of ex-
ternal sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the
Constitution. The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace,
to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereign-
ties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have
vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of na-
tionality.'38
Thus disposed to regard these powers as inherent in sovereignty rather
than granted by the Constitution, federal courts have been disinclined to
acknowledge the questions arising therefrom as answerable by reference
to the fundamental law.' Insofar as federal courts become involved at
all, it is for the purpose of sanctioning presidential actions in these areas, as,
for example, in protecting them against encroachment by state govern-
ments.35 In defining these as powers inhering in sovereignty and therefore
126 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
127 See, e.g., cases cited notes 20 and 21 supra.
18 See cases cited notes 21 and 22 supra.
129 See cases cited note 24 supra.
130 See cases cited notes 117-120 supra.
is' See J. GROSSMAN & R. WELLS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING 555
(1972).
132 See A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 850 (3d ed. 1963).
133 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
's4 See J. GROSSMAN & R. WELLS, supra note 131, at 556-64.
13 5 See C. PRITCHETT, CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, 354-
356 (2d ed. 1968).
Summer, 1976]
17
Dionisopoulos: Judicial Control of the Presidency
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1977
AKRON LAW REVIEW
in the national government, the judiciary claims no role for itself, even though
it is one branch of a tripartite structure. Judicial self-restraint therefore be-
comes especially apparent with respect to foreign affairs and to questions
of war and peace, although it also leads to bitter denunciations by some,
such as Justice Douglas 3 ' and several American scholars,"" who look upon
this hands-off policy of the judiciary as nothing more than a subterfuge to
avoid potentially embarrassing situations for the courts. As Justice Douglas
stated in one of his dissenting opinions:
... there is a weighty view that what has transpired respecting Vietnam
is unconstitutional, absent a declaration of war; that the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution is no constitutional substitute for a declaration of war;
that the making of appropriations was not an adequate substitute; and
that "executive war-making" is illegal. 3"
Such views as these by Professor Wormuth, Douglas reports, are shared
by others.' For example, he cites Hughes, who spoke of the deleterious
consequences for America by reason of the Court's failure to answer the
various questions about our involvement in Vietnam: ".... to deny certi-
orari, to dismiss suits without a reasoned opinion has a tendency to arouse
suspicion that the Court" is shirking its responsibility to apply the basic
principles of the constitutional system. " '
Neither the prodding from Justice Douglas, the cynical expressions of
various dissident groups, nor the form of the issue presented to the Court
and by whom presented,'' could move the majority from its fixed position:
questions about war and peace do not lend themselves to judicial solutions.
At one time, the Court had been no less adamant with respect to
questions raised under the Guaranty Clause of the Constitution,"4 2 which
it saw as the sole source of political questions," ' including those raised about
136 See, e.g., Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S. 936, 948 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
137 The pros and cons are investigated in THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (R. Falk
ed. 1968). See also Legality of United States Participation in the Viet Nam Conflict: A
Symposium, 75 YALE L.J. 1084 (1966).
138 Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S. 936, 947-48 (1968).
139 Id.
140 Hughes, Civil Disobedience and the Political Question Doctrine, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1, 18
(1968).
4' Various litigants had sought standing to challenge the legality of the Vietnam War, includ-
ing the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970),
private citizens caught up in the war by reason of service obligations, cases cited note 16
supra, as well as a member of Congress in conjunction with members of the United States
Air Force in Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304 (1973).
142 U.S. CONST. art. IV, §4.
"43 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 581 (1849).
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the apportionment of legislative seats."' In time, however, questions not
amenable to the judicial process under the Guaranty Clause became amen-
able by transferring them to a different constitutional source.
14 5 Apparently
no similar ruse could be employed by plaintiffs seeking to challenge United
States involvement in Vietnam. Despite the form of the issue' or the
particular status of the litigants,' 7 the Court refused to assume jurisdiction.
It remained adamant even though alliances were possible with members
of Congress" '4 or state governments," 9 and even though the Court could
have anticipated popular and congressional approval, especially after public
opinion polls registered increasingly greater opposition.'
0 The consequence
was that a number of cases, dating from Mitchell v. United States'
5
' and
Mora v. McNarama5 ' to Holtzman v. Schlesinger"' met similar responses
denial of certiorari 5' or refusal to exercise original jurisdiction. 55
At best, Justice Douglas won occasional support from others, such
as Justice Stewart in Mora and Justices Harlan and Stewart in Massachu-
setts v. Laird"6 for getting the Court to assume jurisdiction for the purposes
of considering the more usual questions concerning political issues and
standing and the specialized questions articulated by Douglas."' These
questions, he and Stewart contended, were "of great magnitude," and in-
cluded such matters as the status of individuals bringing suit, the "illegal"
war conducted in Southeast Asia, the constitutionality of "presidential"
wars, presidential power to order draftees to serve in Southeast Asia, the
144 See, e.g., cases cited note 94 supra.
145 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
146 See, e.g., challenging expenditure of funds, Sarnoff v. Schultz, 409 U.S. 929 (1972), or
sending the draftees of a state to fight in an undeclared war, Massachusetts v. Laird, 400
U.S. 886 (1970).
147 E.g., conscientious objectors, Hart v. United States, 391 U.S. 956 (1968), or draftees
with orders to Vietnam, Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967).
148 See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304 (1973).
149 See Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970).
150 See 117 CONG. REC. 1191 (Feb. 1, 1971).
151 386 U.S. 972 (1967).
152 389 U.S. 934 (1967).
153 414 U.S. 1304 (1973).
154 See, e.g., Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S. 948 (1968); Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S.
934 (1967).
15 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970).
15, Id. at 900. Justices Harlan and Stewart briefly stated that the Court should consider the
jurisdictional questions.
157 Justice Douglas identified a number of questions in his several dissenting opinions. See, e.g.,
Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970); Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967);
Mitchell v. United States, 386 U.S. 972 (1967). 19
Dionisopoulos: Judicial Control of the Presidency
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1977
AKRON LAW REVIEW
relationship of military intervention to treaty obligations, and the constitu-
tional acceptability of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution as a substitute for a
congressional declaration of war." 8
No changes in executive-judicial relationships with respect to the
responsibility of conducting American foreign and military policies had
been introduced during the Vietnam conflict. The pattern of judicial responses
corresponds with prior court inaction, and is in accord with the observations
of Professors Grossman and Wells:
The functions of the Supreme Court in the formulation of American
foreign policy are somewhat difficult to grasp, for several reasons. First,
responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations has generally been
considered an executive function, more or less immune from judicial
interference.'
Justice Marshall rationalized the Court's posture in Holtzman v. Schlesinger,26 0
attributing the reluctance to the Court's lack of expertise on military policy:
".... we are on treacherous ground indeed when we attempt judgments as to
its wisdom or necessity.'' 1 61
Apparently, in view of Marshall's additional comments about legisla-
tive involvement, as in Congress' attaching provisos regarding the spending
of funds in military pursuits in Southeast Asia,' 6 ' any external checks upon
presidential power must come from the legislature without an assist from
the judiciary. Whether Congress is any better equipped to check presidential
power in shaping foreign and military policy remains to be determined
from the eventual application of the National Commitments Resolution
of 1969163 and the War Powers Resolution of 1973.164
Another relevant decision, the per curiam opinion in New York Times
Co. v. United States'65 represented but a minor setback for the presidency,
despite the notoriety attached to the publication of the Pentagon Papers.
Seven justices'66 justified prior restraint on publication under certain ex-
treme circumstances; consequently, the decision did not operate as a severe
158 Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934, 935 (1967).
159 See J. GROSSMAN & R. WELLS, supra note 131.
160414 U.S. 1304 (1973).
161 Id. at 1310.
162 Id. at 1312.
163 S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
164 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
165 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
166 Id. at 724, 727, 730, 740, and 752.
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check upon presidential power. Had the absolutist position of Black
and Douglas..7 prevailed, prior restraint would have been prohibited at
all times. As it was, the constitutional doctrine emerged unchanged from
the proposition previously stated in Near v. Minnesota68 and Bantam Books
Inc. v. Sullivan"9 that the government bears a heavy burden in justifying
prior restraint. 7 While Brennan, Stewart, White and Marshall offered con-
curring opinions and could not agree upon common standards, they did
not question the power of the executive to prohibit publication of sensitive,
classified materials. 7'
The Pentagon Papers decision is an unlikely candidate for the ranks
of precedents, since any similar curbing of executive power in the future
would require a replication of the circumstances of this case, that someone
accessible to classified materials reproduce them and make copies available
to the press. The range of options available to the President by the multiplicity
of opinions and the failure of the Court to produce a single, definitive state-
ment regarding the scope of the power to impose prior restraints are reasons
why New York Times Co. v. United States cannot be judged anything more
than a minor setback for the executive branch.
Late in 1974, the Supreme Court rendered still another decision"
2
which implicated both presidential power and the pardon President Ford
granted to his predecessor. In holding that the President has the constitu-
tional authority to reduce a death penalty to life imprisonment, and to make
the recipient forever ineligible for parole,' 3 the majority broadly construed
the powers to grant pardons and clemency. The President is at liberty,
Chief Justice Burger stated, to render "acts of clemency [that] inherently call
for discriminatory" decisions on his part.'' The decision's impact makes
apparent the fact that no force in society - the courts, Congress or the
electorate - may restrict the President in the exercise of this power.
The latter decision had been opportune for President Ford, whose
pardon of former President Nixon and provoked much unfavorable criticism
for various reasons, including the unequal treatment of others accused of
167 Id. at 714 and 720.
168283 U.S. 697 (1931).
19 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
170 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
171 Id. at 724, 727, 730, 740, 752.
172 See, e.g., Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974); Murphy v. Ford, 390 F. Supp. 1372
(W.D. Mich. 1975).
173 Shick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 267 (1974).
174 Id. at 268. Actually, this decision varies little from Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925).
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Watergate-related crimes. In fact, the decision came roughly in the
closing moments of the Watergate cover-up trial of Haldeman, Ehrlichman,
Mitchell, Mardian and Parkinson and underscored the unlimited character
of this power.. and the possibility of granting presidential pardons in a
discriminatory manner.'
The foregoing cases have delineated certain subject matter areas
foreign and military policy-making, and granting pardons, reprieves and
clemency - to which the President acts without interference from the judici-
ary. The Court had exercised a somewhat significant check upon the presi-
dency in the Pentagon Papers Case, although not with the same boldness
that it did in other cases of first impression. As noted, in deciding against
prior restraint on that occasion, the Court failed to produce a major restraint
on presidential power. In sharp contrast were the several instances in 1973
and 1974, when federal courts acknowledged the constitutional doctrine
of executive privilege but limited presidential claims regarding this pre-
rogative.
VI. SPECIFYING THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
President Nixon vigorously contested congressional and judicial en-
croachment upon the executive branch throughout much of 1973 and 1974.
Repeatedly, he argued that he was defending the presidency itself, not his
administration, in asserting executive privilege with respect to tapes and
documents demanded by the Grand Jury""7 and by the Special Prosecutor's
Office for use in the trial of the Watergate cover-up conspirators.7  His
public pronouncements,""9 reports in the press,"' and the briefs presented
175 There is, of course, the specific limitation in the Constitution:
"... [A]nd he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the
United States, except in Cases of Impeachment." U.S. CONST. art. H, §2. Ford's pardon to
Nixon for all federal offenses committed before the former President resigned his office
on August 9, 1974, could not tie the hands of Congress should it proceed with impeach-
ment. There is no definitive constitutional principle regarding the exercise of the impeach-
ment power against a person who has resigned his office. However, what precedents
there are fall on the side of the impeachment process ending with resignation. See J.
BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDIE: AN INQUIRY INTO BRIBERY AND OTHER HIGH CRIMES AND
MISDEMEANORS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1962). See also P. Dionisopoulos, supra note
77, at 99.
176 In his syndicated column of December 29, 1974, Jerald terHorst, who had resigned from
President Ford's staff after the pardoning of former President Nixon, reported that he had
received thousands of letters, some readers claiming that there was no authority for this
action and others believing that it was "unfair of Ford to pardon his predecessor while doing
nothing to help the former Nixon associates undergoing criminal prosecution for Watergate
offenses."
17 7 See In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973).
178 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
179 See e.g., the text of President Nixon's statement regarding the tapes controversy as reported
in the press, October 20, 1973.
180 See, e.g., Chicago Sun-Times, Oct. 17, 1973, at 68, col. 1.
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in his behalf to the courts"8' underscored his claim that the doctrine of
executive privilege was derived from the constitutional principle of separation
of powers, 182 was sanctioned by precedents 8" and was absolute and unquali-
fied, thus not subject to question in other forums.' Never before had there
been an occasion in American constitutional history that the federal courts
were forewarned about presidential defiance. The confrontation highlighted
the apparent weakness with which the courts had previously shunned such
issues. Nonetheless, the judges felt that they could not avoid involvement, no
matter the consequences. "It is clear," the Court of Appeals stated in
Nixon v. Sirica,85 "that the want of physical power to enforce its judgments
does not prevent a court from deciding an otherwise justiciable case."' 8
That presidential defiance failed to materialize may be attributed to
the steadily worsening situation encircling the Nixon Administration. The
demise was especially provoked by Alexander Butterfield's inadvertent
revelation before the Senate Watergate Committee regarding a taping
system installed in the White House and the existence of hundreds of record-
ings between the President and his chief advisers. 87 Subsequent events
steadily eroded the foundations of the administration, culminating one
year later by the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Nixon.
8
" The
President's resignation followed but two weeks after the highest bench
unanimously ruled against him.
Certainly the circumstances surrounding In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum to Nixon, 8 ' Nixon v. Sirica9" and United States v. Nixon'
were of principal importance in the winning of such major victories by
the federal courts. But it should be noted that the climate was not essentially
181 All briefs are reproduced in United States v. Nixon: THE PRESMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME
CouRT 209, 307, 319, 427, 469, and 501 (L. Friedman ed. 1974).
182 See Brief for the Respondent, Cross-Petitioner Richard M. Nixon, President of the United
States, Id. at 337.
183See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 730-737 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (App. II).
184 See Chief Justice Burger's discussion on this point, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
703 (1974).
185 487 F.2d 700 (1973).
186 Id. at 708.
187 See Hearings before the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities of the
United States Senate, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2073-74 (1973) (testimony of Alexander P.
Butterfield).
188 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
189 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973).
190 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
'N 418 U.S. 683 (1974),
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different from the period commencing in the late 1960's when dissatisfaction
substantially increased with our continued involvement in Vietnam.' Further-
more, the President could find little support in the federal courts for the
constitutional position he asserted.'93 The near unanimity of federal judges
at all levels was as persuasive as any other factor in compelling presidential
obedience. Certainly it was more so than President Truman's encounter
in 1952 when his seizure order was invalidated.'
Regardless of the reasons for the courts' victories in these encounters,
the decisions were momentous in other respects. They provided judicial
responses to questions that have long been present but at best have been
only peripheral on other occasions,' or, as in United States v. Burr,9 '
the consequences were so vague as to be variously interpreted."' Is there
a constitutional basis for executive privilege? If such a privilege exists,
is it absolute and unqualified, as claimed by the Nixon administration,
or is it subject to checks by the other branches of government?
"Usage and custom," federal courts have held, "are a source of law
in all governments and have particular force where ... the applicable
written law is ambiguous or unclear.""1 8 The validity of this principle is
readily apparent to American scholars, who have only to point to such
practices as the President's use of his department heads as an advisory body
(a cabinet), or the President's circumvention of the explicit constitutional
provision for treaty making by resort to executive agreements.' As noted
in Nixon v. Sirica,2°0 presidents have asserted executive privilege (without
explicit reference to the terminology) from the moment that George Wash-
192 See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 1191 (Feb. 1, 1971).
"3 In all, the tapes cases were heard by one District Court Judge, seven judges on the Court
of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, and eight members of the Supreme Court. Justice
Relinquist abstained. President Nixon won only two "votes" from the bench, Judges Mac-
Kinnon and Wilkey, who dissented in Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
1 94 See note 101 supra.
195 See generally D. FROHNMAYER, AN ESSAY ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, SAMUEL POOL WEAVER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SERIES No. 1 (1974); E. STANTON, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: AN IN-
STITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE, SAMUEL POOL WEAVER CONSITUTIONAL LAW SERIES No. 1
19 (1974).
196 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14, 692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
197 See, e.g., In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973) (Sirica, J.). See also
United States v. Nixon: THE PRESIDENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 181, at
137; R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 188 (1974); I. Rhodes,
What Really Happened to the Jefferson Subpoena, 60 A.B.A.J. 52 (1974); Berger, Executive
Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1043, 1107 ,1965).
198 See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 730 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (App. II).
199 See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937).
200 487 F.2d 700, 730 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Appendix II).
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ington refused to deliver documents demanded by the House of Representa-
tives in 1796."01 There seems to be little doubt that this is a constitutional
doctrine buttressed by substantial precedent. 20 2 Nevertheless, there have
been those who have challenged the claims of presidents that documents
and materials within the control of the executive branch are not subject
to compulsory release. 0 Clearly, the view espoused by the federal judges
involved in the Watergate tapes cases were contrary, for they acknowledged,
in the words of Chief Justice Burger, that "[t]he President's need for complete
candor and objectivity from advisers calls for great deference from the
Courts."
'
While the federal courts recognized executive privilege as a constitutional
doctrine, they refused to permit the presidency the latitude asserted by the
Nixon Administration. The issue had been raised several months before
the existence of the Watergate tapes became public knowledge.20 1 However, on
that occasion, a divided Court avoided a direct confrontation with the issue.
Representative Mink and several colleagues in Congress urgently requested
that President Nixon release data with respect to the "recommendations and
report by inter-departmental committee" on the advisability of nuclear tests
in the North Pacific. 2 8 This request was denied, compelling Rep. Mink
and thirty-two colleagues to institute a suit under the Freedom of Information
Act. °T Significant breaches with tradition seemed imminent when the Court
of Appeals ordered the District Judge to examine the documents in camera
to ascertain if factual data could be separated and "disclosed without
impinging on the policy-making decisional processes intended to be protected
by" the exemption stated in the law.208 However, the Supreme Court reversed
by narrowly construing the statutory provisions, thereby shunning the
executive privilege issue.2"9 Justice Stewart concurred on the basis that the
case involved no more than an examination of "the meaning of two
exemptive provisions of the so-called Freedom of Information Act. .. 21o
Despite its narrow construction of the statute, the Court did provide
2o1 Id. at 732.
202 In its per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals acknowledged "the long-standing judicial
recognition of executive privilege." Nixon v. Sirca, 487 F.2d 700, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
203 See D. FROHNMAYER, supra note 195 (passim as to various views on this matter).
204 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).
205 See Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
206 Id. at 75.
207 Id.
208 Mink v. Environmental Protective Agency, 464 F.2d 742, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
209 Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 94 (1973).
210 Id.
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an important opening wedge by stating that an in camera examination of
the documents by the District Court was permissible. 1' This was seized
upon by the Court of Appeals in Nixon v. Sirica12 in the same manner
that one of its decisions21 was seized upon.1 by Judge Sirica in In re
Subpoena to Nixon."' The significant aspect in both these judicial pro-
nouncements was that the judges were fashioning an answer to President
Nixon's claim that executive privilege was absolute and unqualified."1 '
The final rejection of this argument of the Administration was delivered
by Chief Justice Burger:
The impediment that an absolute, unqualified privilege would place
in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch
to do justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict with the
function of the courts under Art. III. In designing the structure
of our Government and dividing and allocating the sovereign power
among three co-equal branches, the Framers of the Constitution sought
to provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers were
not intended to operate with absolute independence. 1 "
By distinguishing the proper assertion of the privilege with respect to
the constitutional responsibilities of the presidency, and the improper
use of the doctrine to conceal evidence relevant to a criminal prosecution,
the Court has provided definitive answers where none had previously
existed. The scope of executive privilege questioned in the Watergate tape
cases also pinpointed, apparently for the first time, the tensions between
the two competing principles - separation of powers and the rule of
law. As generally understood within the American constitutional system,
the rule of law declares that all persons, the governors no less than the
governed, are equally subject to the law's command. Insofar as any President
could assert executive privilege as an absolute prerogative, subject to no
limitations other than his own, there was doubt whether our governmental
system was ruled by men rather than by law. There had always been the
possibility that an absolute, unqualified or self-defined privilege, as asserted
by Nixon and as understood by others,218 could be exercised in an arbitrary
211 Id. at 92.
212 487 F.2d 700, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
213 Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
214 Along with the more tangentially related, United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
215 360 F. Supp. 1, at 6 n.13 (D.D.C. 1973).
216 See Brief for Nixon in United States v. Nixon: THE PRESIDENT BEFORE THE SUPREME
COURT, supra note 181, at 350.
217 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974).
218 See authorities cited in Brief for Nixon, in United States v. Nixon: THE PRESIDENT BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 181, at 350-71.
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and capricious manner. Now, with the bold counter-assertions of the
judiciary, this possibility seems less likely. The tensions between contending
constitutional principles has been judicially resolved in favor of the rule
of law. This point was expressed in the per curiam opinion of the Court of
Appeals, wherein it acknowledged that the President is the only nationally
elected official and the representative of all Americans. However, these
peculiar conditions of his office make him neither the embodiment of
"the nation's sovereignty" nor "above the law's commands."
2
' The Court
of Appeals cited favorably to Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in
the Steel Seizure Case220 in which he stated:
With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered
no technique for long preserving free government except that the
Executive be under the law.... 221
Although neither President Johnson nor President Nixon had created
"the imperial presidency," for various reasons - not the least of which were
Vietnam and Watergate - they seemed to various American scholars
221
as the fulfillment of de Riencourt's warning in the 1950's about The Coming
of the Caesars. If, in fact, there has been a redress in the checks and
balances of the American political system, much of the credit must be attribu-
ted to the judiciary. It acted in the face of possible presidential defiance, and
at a time in history in which all governmental actions were subjected to
intense scrutiny and criticism. It accomplished:
the two things most beloved by American judges - uphold the "rule
of law" against claims of prerogative or privilege by the executive,
and expand still further the discretionary power of the judiciary
in the American constitutional system.228
VII. JUDICIAL LIMITS ON PRESIDENTIAL POWERS TO DEAL
WITH SUBVERSIVES
Federal courts have maintained a hands-off policy with respect to
the President's conduct of external affairs, thus responding in accordance
with fixed, traditional patterns. On the other hand, while federal courts
had traditionally refused to become involved in the somewhat related area
of internal security, they have departed significantly from this pattern
219 Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d at 711 (D.D.C. 1973).
220 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
221 Id. at 655.
222See A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973); J. BURNs, PRESIDENTIAL GovERN-
MENT: THE CRUCIBLE OF LEADERSHIP (1965), reviewed, Morgenthau, 6 N.Y. REV. OF BooKs
11 (March 31, 1966).
223 A. WESTiN, supra note 6, at xiii.
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since the 1950's, rejecting legislative and executive demands that domestic
threats to national security be vigorously confronted and destroyed. They
do not question the need for protection against subversive activities. What
they have required is that the protective devices be tailored to constitutional
standards.
From time to time, American courts have confronted a variety of
constitutional issues born of fears that the American political system and
institutions are about to be subverted. While the evidence is rather per-
suasive that this democracy is one of the most viable and stable in the
world, these fears have resulted in the promulgation of statutes224 and
executive orders225 intended to defend against the internal enemies of the
social order. Presumably the constitutional issues raised thereby can be read-
ily resolved by mere reference to the fundamental law. However, as indicated
by our national history from the adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791
to World War II, the pendulum was more likely to swing toward authority
than toward liberty, a movement that was passively aided by a judiciary
shackled by the belief that the political branches should have wide con-
stitutional latitude to make the system and its institutions secure.2
The situation evolved such that Americans may ask whether they
have two constitutions - one for war and one for peace. In fact, the
constitutional record prior to 1953 can be aptly characterized by reference
to the phrase "the Fiction of the First Freedom. 2 2 1 In his critical appraisal
of the Supreme Court, Richard Sklar wrote of the failure to protect left-wing
sympathizers, especially in time of war.228 The Court was "the pre-eminent
custodian of existing values" and the rostrum for expressing social ortho-
doxy's resentment against those who threatened to establish a new order.""'
Further support for such critical assessments was provided by Professor
Dahl2. and other scholars,22 ' who found little in the record of American
224 E.g., Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 78 §1, 1 Stat. 596; Espionage Act. of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat.
217 (1917); Smith Act of 1940, 18 U.S.C. §2385 (1971); and the Internal Security Act of
1950, 50 U.S.C. §781 (1954).
225 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 9835, 3 C.F.R. 627 (1947). See generally J. SCttR, LOYALTY IN
AMERICA (1957).
226 See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Debs v. United States, 249
U.S. 211 (1919).
227 Sklar, The Fictions of the First Freedom, 6 W. POL. Q. 302 (1953).
228 Id. at 3 18.
229 Id. at 319.
2
3
0 Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National Policy Maker,
6 J. PuB. L. 279, 292 (1957).
23 1 E.g., D. LocKHARD, THE PERVERTED PRIORTIES OF AMERICAN PoLmcs 211 (1971);
Dorsen, The Court of Some Resort, 1 Ciw. LIB. REV. 82 (1974).
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constitutional law to warrant any favorable comment on the Court as
"Keeper of Our Liberties.
23 2
These negative assessments are useful for two reasons. First, they
portray a more accurate appraisal of the Court's function throughout its
historical existence. Secondly, they may help us appreciate the massive
changes that have occurred on several constitutional fronts, beginning in
the 1950's and continuing to the present.
233
In support of the latter point of view, we should recall that between
1943 and 1974, more than forty national statutes had been voided because
they abridged fundamental freedoms, 3' procedural safeguards, 2 5 and other
constitutional rights. Within this same time frame, and paralleling the
nullification of national statutes, were the judicial impositions of restraints
upon presidents, who believed that their constitutional obligation to safeguard
the nation warranted virtually any action, irrespective of the consequences
for civil liberties. For example, when the American Jacobins threatened, 8t
or when Unionists feared the Confederacy,2 1 the national government had
acted. Small wonder that, after World War 1iI, presidents exercised question-
able powers in the belief that the Constitution sanctioned any policies
consonant with the goal of preserving the system and its institutions. There
was, however, one major difference. After World War H, the federal
courts were not inclined to defer to the presidency. For purposes of protecting
civil liberties, they were now willing to declare that the President had
either exceeded statutory authority23 ' or was without the constitutional
sanctions claimed. '
The Warren Court (1953-1969) was primarily responsible for curbing
legislative and executive powers in this post-war period. However, the
momentum of the Warren Court continued in important areas with the
accession of Burger to the highest judicial post. Many Americans perceived
the Burger Court as created in the image of Richard Nixon, thereby com-
232 See C. WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT 149-50 (rev. ed.
1935) where in it is claimed that the Court played this role for approximately seventy years.
233 See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); United
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles 350 U.S. 11 (1955). See also cases cited notes 44-57 supra.
2 34 See cases cited notes 44 and 45 supra. See also Dionisopoulos, supra note 42.
235 See cases cited notes 46-48 supra.
2 36 See cases cited notes 49-57 supra.
237 See J. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS (1951).
238 The Oath of Office Act of 1862, ch. 128, 12 Stat. 502 (1862).
239 See, e.g., Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968).
240 See, e.g., United States v. United States District Court 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
Summer, 1976]
29
Dionisopoulos: Judicial Control of the Presidency
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1977
mitted to conservative philosophy and judicial self-restraint. " ' But such
impressions are superficial, since the Supreme Court under Burger has
nullified more national laws on First Amendment and equal protection
grounds than any predecessor," 2 furthered the momentum established in
civil rights cases,' and administered severe defeats to the Nixon presi-
dency.44 Certainly, these decisions must be ranked among the major victories
achieved by the judiciary.
To understand the particular significance of the Court's ruling in
behalf of individual liberties against the commands of the political branches,
one need only recall the political climate that generally prevailed after
World War II. Among the elements of that political climate were the
Cold War, McCarthyism, anti-subversive policies,' and Vietnam, the
longest, most divisive foreign war in our national history. Since circumstances
are important in determining whether the courts will become involved,judicial deference to the political branches was to be expected, especially
at the outset of this era of national concern over subversive activities."4"
However, it should also be noted that, even before these several forces
disappeared, judicial deference yielded to judicial intervention in behalf of
civil liberties. What made these incidents the more noteworthy was the
fact that the judiciary was now willing to answer questions impacted by
the war powers and national security, thus issues that it had traditionally
avoided. This is illustrated in the following discussion.
The lack of protection for the political left prior to 1953, which was
reported by Sklar, was soon overcome as federal courts began to impose
a variety of limitations and restraints on legislative powers.4 " All of these
241 See Dorsen, supra, note 231; N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1971, at 24, col. 1.
242 See cases decided after 1968, notes 44 and 53 supra.
243 See, e.g., North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971); Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). But cf. Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1972).
244 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
242 E.g., Communist Control Act of 1954, 50 U.S.C. §841 (1954); Internal Security Act of
1950, 50 U.S.C. §781 (1950); Exec. Order No. 9835, 3 C.R.F. 627 (1947).
24r See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); American Communications Ass'n.
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
24 7 See Chief of Capitol Police v. Jeannette Rankin Brigade, 409 U.S. 972 (1972); Schacht v.
United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Albertson v.Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70 (1965); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S.437 (1965); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); Lamont v. Postmaster-General,
381 U.S. 301 (1965); Aptheker v. Rusk, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Subversive Activities ControlBoard v. Boarda, 421 F.2d 1142 (D.D.C. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1042 (1970); Stewart
v. Washington, 301 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1969); Reed v. Gardner, 261 F. Supp. 87 (C.D.
Cal. 1966).
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decisions were rendered within the period of America's involvement in
Vietnam. These limitations, in addition to the fact that the First Amendment
can no longer be regarded as a "fiction," distinguished the period following
Sklar's comments in 1953. What had become apparent in these cases
corresponds to the remarks of former Chief Justice Warren that "the phrase
'the war power' cannot be invoked as a talismanic incantation to support
any exercise of congressional power which can be brought within its
ambit."2 8
Warren's statements with respect to congressional power can be
generalized to include executive power, for those of each branch were
progressively subjected to judicially defined boundaries. Particularly sus-
ceptible to judicial response were the efforts of the executive branch to
deal with subversives.4 9 Different in nature from the cases noted, which
dealt principally with "security risks" in public service, was United States
v. United States District Court.25°
Nearly all the post-war administrations shared roughly the same fears
concerning the possible existence of subversives within the government.
Thus, even before Senator McCarthy emerged on the national scene as
a leading Cold Warrior, President Truman and his Attorney General
initiated steps to forbid subversives from public service. Their efforts and
those of their successors to create an effective security-loyalty scheme
prompted many lawsuits. But as Professor Pritchett notes, the Court was
reluctant to adjudicate the constitutional issues,251 preferring to dispose
of these cases on other grounds. For libertarians, this was far from an entirely
disappointing approach, since the Court voided several executive practices
that 1) failed to meet procedural due process requirements;252 2) comported
with neither agency"' nor statutory guidelines;... 3) were utterly devoid ofstatutory authorization;' or 4) were in excess of the authority granted by
248 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263 (1967).
249 See Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968); Taylor v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 709 (1959);
Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Harmon v.
Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); Cole v. Young, 351
U.S. 536 (1956); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
250 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
251 C. PRrrcHrrT, supra note 1, at 544.
252 See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
253 Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
24 Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
255 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1959).
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statute.25 Thus, such elements as legislative intent, rather than constitutional
authority, were determining factors in these decisions.
Only in part had United States v. United States District Court ", turned
on a question of legislative intent with respect to presidential power. Much
more important than the intent of Congress was the question whether
the President, in the fulfillment of his constitutional obligation to safeguard
national institutions and the political system, could authorize warrantless,
electronic surveillance of domestic security risks. This had been the practice
of the executive branch since May, 1940.258 Because of the Cold War, this
practice was further sanctioned more or less continuously by various Presi-
dents and Attorney Generals since July, 1946.259 Apparently these several
officials believed that they had to maintain electronic surveillance "of
those who plot unlawful acts against the Government."280 Since none of
the recent Presidents believed that it was necessary to obtain prior judicial
approval before instituting a particular surveillance program, there was an
implied presumption that this practice conformed to the executive's con-
stitutional obligation to protect the nation against subversion.
These precedents had been an important part of the government's
argument before the Court, especially since they seemed to be sanctioned
by a proviso in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.61
There, Congress stated that nothing in the law was to be interpreted as
limiting:
the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as hedeems necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of
the Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any
other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the
Government."2
This proviso seemed to imply exactly what the Nixon Administration argued:
Congress had recognized and affirmed the President's constitutional authority
to order warrantless, electronic surveillance of domestic security risks.
However, it was an argument that the Court was not prepared to accept.
By reconstructing the legislative history, the Court determined that there
had been no such intent in Congress; not could it find any sanction for
256 Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968).
257 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
258 1d. at 210 n.10.
25 9 Id.
260 Id.
261 18 U.S.C. §§2510-20 (1968).
262 407 U.S. at 302 (1972), citing 18 U.S.C. .2511(3).
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this practice in the Constitution." 3 The Court admitted that "domestic
security surveillance may involve different policy and practical considerations
from the surveillance of 'ordinary crime'." ' And while Congress could
confer authority upon the executive branch, "prior judicial approval is
required for the type of domestic security surveillance involved in this
case....
The conclusion most forcefully supported by the various decisions
identified was that the Court was no longer willing to defer questions of
national security to the political branches. The Government had suggested
that the Court practice self-restraint, since "internal security matters are
too subtle and complex for judicial evaluation. 26  This suggestion was the
same as one expressed several years earlier, and met a similar response from
the Court. In 1967, the United States reminded the Court of its past practice
of deferring to Congress on questions about legislation enacted under the
authority of the war power.6 7 Former Chief Justice Warren, while ac-
knowledging the past practice, stated that the Court would not defer merely
because of "a talismanic incantation" of the phrase "the war power. '2 " ,
Obviously the same was now true of "national security." While many of
the Court's responses to questions about the President's power to handle
subversives had been circumspect and even timid, on this particular matter
of warrantless, electronic surveillance of domestic security risks, the judges
disregarded executive policies and practices of considerable standing and
flatly stated that there is no constitutional authority for them. "National
security" no less than the "war power" would not prompt a judicial act of
obeisance.
VIII. JUDICIAL PROHIBITIONS ON PRESIDENTIAL
IMPOUNDMENT OF FUNDS
It was previously asserted that the Pentagon Papers Case ' had a
major impact on the Nixon Administration but caused virtually no harm
to the presidency. 7" The reverse has been true of the many presidential im-
poundment decisions, for even in the face of a host of negative judicial
responses, President Nixon successfully persisted in his refusal to spend
263 d. at 320-24.
264 Id. at 322.
265 Id. at 324.
266 Id. at 320.
267 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263 (1967).
268 Id.
269403 U.S. 713 (1971).
2 70 See text accompanying notes 131-76, supra.
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the appropriated funds.27' Nevertheless, these decisions are significant in
that they: 1) were the first instances of direct confrontation by the federal
courts '7 with the question whether a President may refuse to spend funds
appropriated by Congress; 73 2) will probably have a significant deterrent
effect in the future; and 3) are easily harmonized with congressional efforts
to curb presidential power. 7'
Only Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes"5 related at all to the
question of an executive officer's refusal to spend congressionally appropriated
funds."7 6 Kendall had at most a tangential relationship to the issue raised
in the recent impoundment cases. Thus, while the practice of impounding
funds was precedented, ' not until 1971"'1 had the issue of presidential
power to do so been directly confronted in federal courts. As reported by
one legal scholar, ".... of the more than fifty cases that have been decided as
of this date [March 25, 1974], less than half a dozen" have been in favor
of the position asserted by President Nixon." 9 What is revealed in Glass'
study is the frequency with which these cases made their way into the courts
and the regularity with which federal courts ruled against the presidency.
However, it must also be noted their inefficacy in that at no time did President
Nixon act in compliance with these decisions. Had the Supreme Court
accepted Georgia v. Nixon 8' under its original jurisdiction and provided
therein as "definitive" an answer as in United States v. Nixon"8' and United
States v. United States District Court,' the situation might have been differ-
ent. Judicial control of the presidency on this particular matter could have
been established, providing President Nixon had been as obedient as he
was on those other occasions. In 1975, the Supreme Court added to the
defeats President Nixon sustained in lower federal courts " by unanimously
271 See GLASS, supra note 113, at 75. See also Note, Impoundment of Funds, 86 HLRv. L. REv.
1505, 1506 (1973).
272 GLASS, supra note 113, at 9 and 75.
2 7
3 Id.
274 E.g., The Congressional Budget Act of 1974, 31 U.S.C. §1301 (Supp. IV 1974).
275 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
276 GLASS, supra note 113, at 9: See also Note, Impoundment of Funds, 86 HARv. L. REv.
1505, 1515 (1973).
277 Note, Impoundment of Funds, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1505, 1507 (1973).
278 San Francisco Redevelopment Agency v. Nixon, 329 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Cal. 1971).
279 GLASS, supra note 113, at 81-140.
2
8 0 
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 810 (1973).
281418 U.S. 683 (1974).
282 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
283 See generally the cases listed by GLASS, supra note 113, at 81-140.
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deciding against presidential impoundment of funds.
284 However, since
there had not been a formal "definitive" ruling while he was in office, Presi-
dent Nixon was in a position to act in the manner of his predecessors,
285
claiming constitutional and statutory grounds for his refusal to spend fed-
eral funds. 88
The short-term results are not as important as the long-term conse-
quences for presidential power. An issue of first impression had been
introduced by these many impoundment cases. Despite the apparent sanc-
tions of custom and usage, federal courts willingly ruled against the Presi-
dent. Judicially defined limitations on presidential impoundment powers
had been offered where none previously existed. And the federal courts
entered into an alliance with the legislative branch, which was in a position
to make more definitive and effective the limits on the presidency in this
specific area. That a combination of decisions having a deterrent effect and
statutorily imposed restraints on presidential impoundment of funds was
necessary to achieve this victory over the executive should not be minimized.
The role of the federal courts is still impressive and made more so by the
fact that the issue of presidentially impounded funds was one of first
impression.
IX. THE AREA OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
Both the Marshall Court and John Marshall in his concurrent capacity
as judge of the circuit court demonstrated the supremacy of the judiciary
in one area - criminal prosecutions. The first incident was United States
v. Burr, 8' wherein Marshall undermined the Administration's case against
the former Vice President by dismissing the indictment. The charge against
Burr had been treason. However, Marshall ruled that the charge could
not be sustained since it failed to meet the constitutional definition of
treason, 88 the only acceptable definition of this particular offense. With
the dismissal of the indictment of Burr, the Jefferson Administration was
without means to proceed in a criminal prosecution, except for presidential
action in influencing the Senate to force the resignation of Senator John
Smith of Ohio. 8 ' This, however, was much too unique a situation to serve
284 Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975); Train v. Campaign Clean Water, Inc.,
420 U.S. 136 (1975).
285 Note, Impoundment of Funds, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1505, 1507-12 (1973).
286 Id. at 1513-16, and 1516-29.
287 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 469 (1807).
288 Id. at 470-89.
28 9 See P. DIoNIsOPOULOS, supra note 77. 35
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as a precedent and as a means for the President's countering an unfavorable
judicial ruling.
Several years later, after Jefferson completed his second term in office,
the Marshall Court administered still another legal lesson to the presidency.
This case arose under conditions not too dissimilar from the Federalists'
efforts to punish their critics through journalism.
Jeffersonians had vigorously opposed the Sedition Act of 1798,90
arguing that these Federalist sponsored measures did violence to constitu-
tional principles.29' Despite their earlier stance, the Jeffersonians proved
to be no more thick skinned than President Adams and his party. Stung
by the editorial barbs of the Federalist press, they proceeded in the courts
against the culprits, but without benefit of statute.29" The prosecution of
the publisher and editor of the Connecticut Currant had been indicted
under the old common law rule of seditious libel. However, it was a prose-
cution that the Marshall Court would not permit. The Supreme Court
declared the nonexistence of any federal common law crime. Therefore, a
person may only be held to answer in federal courts for offenses that are
defined by statute. 93
Burr and Hudson demonstrated that the judiciary is not powerless
in the face of a vigorous executive. The latter was not permitted to pro-
ceed against any American, except upon a charge of treason within the
definition of Article III of the Constitution,"" or under the offenses defined
by statute.
The significance of those earlier instances of federal courts curbing pres-
dential power should not be overlooked; nor should the more recent incidents
in Jencks v. United States,9' United States v. United States District Court,'2 8
the peripheral, yet relevant, Ellsberg v. Mitchell,29 and Judge Byrne's dismissal
of the case against Ellsberg and Russo by reason of the conduct of persons
employed in the executive branch, 98 be dismissed lightly. It may be, as
William Buckley contended, Byrne's dismissal of the case was without justi-
290 Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 73, §1, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
29L Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 4 ELLIOTr's DEBATES 529 (1888).
292 See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
293 Id. at 34.
294 "Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in
adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort." U.S. CONST. art. III, §3.
295 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
296 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
297 353 F. Supp. 515 (D.D.C. 1973).
298 See text of Byrne's statement in N.Y. Times, May 12, 1973, at 14, col. 1.
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fication.'"1 His contention notwithstanding, the fact is that the judiciary is
in a powerful position when encounters with the executive arise in this
particular area. When the judiciary dismisses criminal actions for any of
the several rationales stated, such as, an informant's statements must be
made available to the defendant, 00 or that evidence obtained under presi-
dentially authorized warrantless surveillance is not admissible,
30
' or that
the criminal prosecution may not be corrupted by the executive branch,
02
the President may not be disobedient. In such matters, federal courts are
supreme and not in any manner accountable to or reviewable by the execu-
tive branch.
CONCLUSION
The evidence is persuasive as to the correctness of the underlying
thesis: There have been important changes in the pattern of executive-
judicial encounters since the 1950's - changes that mark this most recent
period as unique in American constitutional history. The new pattern began
to emerge with the Steel Seizure Case in 1952,303 a decision that is usually
described as exceptional and as an aberration. From the vantage point of
1976, a review of the past quarter of a century establishes this decision
as inaugurating a new era in which federal courts acted boldly in challenging
exercised presidential powers, including some that had the sanction of
precedents. It is true that the Supreme Court declined jurisdiction over issues
relating to war, peace and foreign relations, and that it sanctioned the
pardoning power as the exclusive prerogative of the President." 4 Whatever
checks exist on the exercise of power in these areas must be left to the
Congress and the electorate. They have not been imposed by the judiciary.
Although the courts have maintained their traditional roles in these
areas, the extent of executive-judicial encounters does not end there. Eight
classes of cases have been discovered in which the courts have acted in
recent years in limiting presidential powers. The number of categories is
significant in itself since it suggests a wide range of activities by the courts.
Also significant is the fact that some of these cases involved issues of first im-
pression. For the first time in American constitutional history the judiciary
was providing answers where none previously existed. Moreover, federal
299 Note, 25 NAT'L. REV. 1427 (1973).
300 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668 (1957).
301 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
302 See N.Y. Times, supra note 298.
303 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
304 See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974); Murphy v. Ford, 390 F. Supp. 372 (W.D. Mich.
1975).
Summer, 1976]
37
Dionisopoulos: Judicial Control of the Presidency
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1977
AKRON LAW REVIEW
courts have been exercising their power of judicial review since World War
II in a manner that is without parallel in American history-" 5 Thus, the
parallels between two recent developments in American constitutional
law materialize: the judiciary's more vigorous response to issues of presi-
dential powers corresponds with its bolder action in voiding national laws.
It is evident that the Court's decision to grant or deny jurisdiction
is dictated by factors other than the possibility of subsequent presidential
defiance. Our inclination has been to be governed by the kinds of judgments
made as early as 1788 by Alexander Hamilton 3 ' and more recently by
Professor Schubert." 7 There is no doubt, as Hamilton observed, that the
effectiveness of judicial rulings depends upon the willingness of the executive
to enforce them. Therefore, since the responsibility for enforcing court
decisions lies with the executive branch, there is a question whether the
President would enforce any that undermine his own prerogatives. Because
of this, and by reference to his view of the historical record, Professor Schu-
bert claims that the presidency was victorious in all major encounters with
the courts. The fact is, however, that only one instance which may properly
be cited was Lincoln's defiance of Taney.
What should be recognized is the rarity of the few examples of
defiance of the courts. Therefore, the rules identified by Professor Westin
may not be assumed to be valid. The record since the 1950's suggests
that the courts can confront the presidency on a multitude of questions.
And, as shown in these many cases since the 1950's, President Truman's
statement regarding his reaction to the Steel Seizure decision of 1952 must
be deemed the position of his successors as well: "Like Franklin Roosevelt,
I feel that the Supreme Court may at times have to be urged but it should
never be defied. 308
305 See text accompanying notes 38 through 55 supra.
306 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
307 See G. SHUBERT, supra note 2.
308 Comment, Review of the Presidency in the Courts, 1 MIDwEST JOURNAL OF PoLTcAL
SCIENCE 92 (1957).
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